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Abstract. This article describes some counterintuitive consequences of instituting safety standards and 
accountability practices at nuclear weapons plants. 
 
Many textbooks on organizational psychology and management emphasize the need for explicit 
standards and accountability for one's actions. Standards are posited to be necessary so that employees 
will know what they're supposed to do. Accountability--some mixture of (1) positive and negative 
reinforcement for doing what's supposed to be done and for not doing what's not supposed to be done 
and (2) punishment and omission training for not doing what's supposed to be done and for doing 
what's not supposed to be done--is posited to be necessary so that employees will be motivated to 
manifest appropriate behavior and act on this motivation. Accountability also is posited to facilitate and 
reinforce the comprehension and retention of standards. And so turns the virtual world. 
 
In the real world, there are complicating factors comprising significant and complex disparities between 
the needs of the organization and the needs of employees. These disparities too often lead employees 
to viewing standards and accountability as impediments to reward--positive and negative 
reinforcement--for themselves and their loved ones, not as objectives with which compliance yields 
intrinsic pleasure and benefits for the organization and even the larger community. When these 
disparities are not factored into systems of standards and accountability, disaster may strike. For 
example, if violations of standards are otherwise to formally lead to noxious consequences, employees 
can seek to cover up violations all together or to scapegoat the innocent. Both of these possibilities are 
most easily accomplished through the unobserved falsification or destruction of data and through the 
coopting or denigrating of monitors of standards. (The same dynamics are pertinent when reward--
positive and negative reinforcement--is withheld until or further increased when behavior is "above" 
standard. Here "above" standard quickly becomes standard, expected, and unmet via a sense of 
entitlement. And again the same dynamics are pertinent when standards are met. Here the notion that 
not meeting standards and meeting standards can result in similar reward--if one does not get caught 
not meeting standards, and if not meeting standards and covering up one's accountability takes less 
work than doing the job right--quickly becomes salient and robust in controlling employee behavior. 
 
When cover-ups and scapegoating involve organizations geared to market products that satisfy needs 
produced through marketing, the consequences may be unsettling as to views of human nature but are 
otherwise unremarkable. When cover-ups and scapegoating involve organizations whose dysfunction 
can lead to significant health hazards, the consequences can become staggering. 
 
At facilities in Hanford, Washington, the above analysis seems germane in the lack of attention of some 
Department of Energy authorities and contract site managers towards leaks from underground tanks of 
radioactive waste--in liquid, sludge, and dried salt forms--into the ground and into ground water moving 
towards the Columbia River. The analysis also seems germane for the unfortunate gaps in knowledge 
about how to clean up the contamination and prevent additional damage. 
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The bottom line? The selection, training, and management Issues for nuclear weapons plants must 
confront what may be termed senses of entitlement--arrogating to oneself the "right" to disobey, 
exploit, or subvert standards and accountability. Yet given that employees up and down the chains of 
command may be subject to sense of entitlement, one may end up fearfully confronting a nuclear 
version of the old Soviet Union. They pretend to manage us, and we pretend to comply. (See Buckalew, 
L.W., & Buckalew, N.M. (1995). Survey of the nature and prevalence of patients' noncompliance and 
implications for intervention. Psychological Reports, 76, 315-321; Dickson, R.E., Manusov, V., Cody, M.J., 
& McLaughlin, M.L. (1996). When hearing's not believing: Perceived differences between public and 
private explanations for two compliance failures. Journal of Language and Social Psychology, 15, 27-39; 
Fogarty, J.S. (1997). Reactance theory and patient noncompliance. Social Science and Medicine, 45, 
1277-1288; Wald, M.L. (March 23, 1998). Admitting error at a weapons plant. The New York Times, p. 
A10.) (Keywords: Accountability, Bureaucracies, Organizations, Safety, Security.) 
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